Do political instability, terrorism, and corruption have deterring effects on tourism development even in the presence of unesco heritage? A cross-country panel estimate by Yap, Ghialy Choy Lee & Saha, Shrabani
Edith Cowan University 
Research Online 
ECU Publications 2013 
1-1-2013 
Do political instability, terrorism, and corruption have deterring 
effects on tourism development even in the presence of unesco 
heritage? A cross-country panel estimate 
Ghialy Choy Lee Yap 
Edith Cowan University, c.yap@ecu.edu.au 
Shrabani Saha 
Edith Cowan University, S.Saha@ecu.edu.au 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ecuworks2013 
 Part of the Tourism and Travel Commons 
10.3727/108354213X13782245307911 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Cognizant Communication Corporation on November 1, 
2013 : Yap, G. , & Saha, S. (2013). Do political instability, terrorism, and corruption have deterring effects on tourism 
development even in the presence of unesco heritage? A cross-country panel estimate. Tourism Analysis, 18(5), 
587-599. Original article available online here 
This Journal Article is posted at Research Online. 
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ecuworks2013/894 
587
Tourism Analysis, Vol. 18, pp. 587–599 1083-5423/13 $60.00 + .00
Printed in the USA. All rights reserved. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3727/108354213X13782245307911
Copyright © 2013 Cognizant Comm. Corp. E-ISSN 1943-3999
 www.cognizantcommunication.com
Address correspondence to Ghialy Yap, School of Accounting, Finance and Economics, Faculty of Business and Law,  
Edith Cowan University, 270 Joondalup Drive, Joondalup WA 6027, Australia. E-mail: c.yap@ecu.edu.au
Tourism Organization, 2006). For those developing 
countries that have abundant labor supply, tourism is 
considered as an industry that can alleviate poverty 
and create jobs to financially support the poor.
Nevertheless, similar to any business, tourism 
is considerably sensitive to political environment. 
When a country experiences stable governance and 
sound political system, it encourages more national 
and foreign investments in physical buildings 
DO POLITICAL INSTABILITY, TERRORISM, AND CORRUPTION HAVE 
DETERRING EFFECTS ON TOURISM DEVELOPMENT EVEN IN THE 
PRESENCE OF UNESCO HERITAGE? A CROSS-COUNTRY PANEL ESTIMATE
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This article evaluates the effects of political instability, terrorism, and corruption on tourism develop-
ment, particularly UNESCO-listed heritage destinations. Using a fixed-effects panel data analysis for 
139 countries over the period 1999–2009, the result reveals that a one-unit increase in political insta-
bility decreases tourist arrivals and tourism revenue between 24% and 31% and 30% and 36%, respec-
tively. Furthermore, in the presence of heritage, terrorism has negative effects on tourism demand 
even though its effect is lower than that of political instability. However, the study shows that an 
increase in corruption index would not have an adverse influence on tourist arrival numbers, particu-
larly for those countries that have historical and natural heritage. Perhaps, many experienced travelers 
have expectations that they would require paying bribes to corrupt authorities for travel visa or permits 
to some tourist destinations in order to make things accessible. Moderation effect results indicate that 
political instability reduces tourism demand even in UNESCO-listed heritage destinations.
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Introduction
For most countries, particularly developing 
 economies, tourism plays an important role in gen-
erating employment opportunities and revenues. 
Because tourism is a labor-intensive industry, many 
job activities are related to the supply chain of the sec-
tor such as food delivery services, production and sale 
of handicrafts, recreational activities, and construc-
tion of tourism infrastructures (United Nations World 
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2006; Neumayer, 2004; Sönmez, 1998); however, 
whether terrorism and corruption will affect tour-
ists’ decisions to travel still remains puzzling. 
Tourists in modern days would prefer new travel 
experience particularly to those Third World des-
tinations that may have considerably high level of 
corruption but may not necessarily be politically 
unstable.  Mowforth and Munt (2009) found that 
between 2000 and 2004, the number of tourist arriv-
als to African, Asia Pacific, and Middle East coun-
tries increased by 4.4%, 6.9%, and 9.5% per annum, 
respectively, whereas the annual growth rate of 
tourist arrivals to European and American countries 
was just 2.7% and -0.5%, respectively (pp. 93–94). 
They asserted that the new global travel patterns can 
be related to the rising middle class in the middle-
income economies and the attractive travel package 
offered by these Third World destinations with good 
value for money. Also, perhaps the modern tourists 
prefer destinations that can offer more prestigious 
tourism products (i.e., UNESCO heritage).
Figure 1 illustrates the average political insta-
bility and corruption indices as well as the tour-
ism growth rate from 1999 to 2009 and presents 
some interesting findings. Highly corrupt and 
 terrorist-prone countries have a relatively high level 
of tourist growth rate. For instance, tourist arriv-
als to Uganda grew approximately by 17% annu-
ally between 1999 and 2009 despite the country’s 
high corruption and terrorism indices. Similarly, 
India is classified as one of the most corrupt coun-
tries; but its tourist number grew by 7.9% yearly. 
In contrast, those countries that are relatively stable 
and less corrupt tend to have low tourism growth. 
For example, Switzerland is considered as one of 
the safest countries in the world with low levels 
of political instability, terrorism, and corruption; 
however, its tourism was recorded at merely 1.2% 
annual growth during 1999 and 2009. Therefore, 
on the basis of the above arguments, could a tour-
ist choose a travel destination depending more on 
tourism products and less on the destination’s polit-
ical environment or both?
In addressing the inquiry into the impact of 
political instability, terrorism, and corruption on 
tourism, with a few exceptions, the majority of the 
empirical studies have examined various country 
and/or regional case studies but cross-sectional 
comparative analysis has been lacking (such as 
(i.e., hotels and infrastructures) and in services (i.e., 
marketing campaign and security). Such tourism 
investment not only promotes the country’s eco-
nomic growth but can also create a positive des-
tination’s image as a safe and comfortable place 
to travel. Hall and O’Sullivan (1996) quoted that 
“issues of political stability and political relations 
within and between states are extremely important 
in determining the image of destinations in tourist-
generating regions and . . . the real and perceived 
safety of tourists” (p. 105). When a country experi-
ences political upheaval and terrorist-related inci-
dence, potential tourists may be warned not to visit 
the country and that could significantly affect its 
tourism industry. Although most studies would prob-
ably agree that political instability and terrorism 
discourage the tourism industry, the magnitude of 
these effects looking at the UNESCO’s listed heri-
tage countries has yet to be measured. In order to 
fill this gap, we evaluate the impacts using well-
known and widely used political risk data from 
International Country Risk Guide for the period 
1999–2009.
Like political instability and terrorism, corruption 
can adversely affect a country’s tourism industry as 
revealed by the tourism literature (Das & Dirienzo, 
2010; Lau & Hazari, 2011). Das and Dirienzo 
(2010) argued that if a country practices bribery and 
fraudulent business practice, this can deteriorate its 
social and cultural image and impede its tourism 
competitiveness. Moreover, political inconsistency 
arising from the constant change of governments 
could raise the cost of doing business in corrupted 
countries and generate barriers for investments in 
tourism (Tosun & Timothy, 2001). A politically cor-
rupt nation can indirectly exacerbate public turmoil 
when conflicts between corrupt politicians and the 
people of the country and/or opposition political 
parties become intense. One of the recent incidents 
is the ousting of Egypt’s former regime in 2011 
where the incident witnessed days of blood dem-
onstrations and chaos (Lagi, Bertrand, &  Bar-Yam, 
2011). Even though the country’s political revolu-
tion is currently over, Euromonitor (2011) projected 
that its tourist arrival number is predicted to decline 
by 2% in 2012 as potential tourists are still wary of 
traveling to Egypt.
The literature suggests that political instability 
has adverse effects on tourism (e.g., Issa & Altinay, 
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profitability, and hence, estimates of expected future 
demand constitute an important element in all plan-
ning of tourism activities particularly for perishable 
tourism products (Song & Witt, 2006). Therefore, 
it is crucial that a demand model should incorporate 
political risk indicators that evidently play a sig-
nificant influence on tourism businesses (e.g., Hoti, 
McAleer, & Shareef, 2007;  Neumayer, 2004), espe-
cially in countries that contain  UNESCO-listed heri-
tage. The model not only aims to generate accurate 
tourism forecasts but also to give correct estimations 
of the long-term financial commitments to rebuild 
and sustain heritage tourism in highly political 
unstable countries.
Political Instability, Corruption, and 
Heritage Tourism: A Brief Overview
Political instability can be viewed in three per-
spectives. First, it is the propensity for regime or 
government change; second, it can be related to the 
political upheaval or violence in a society; and third, 
it focuses on instability in government policies 
that are subject to frequent changes (Darity, 2008, 
Hoti, McAleer, & Shareef, 2005; Narayan, 2005; 
Neumayer, 2004). Moreover, to the best of our 
knowledge, there is no single empirical study that 
investigates the impact of political instability, ter-
rorism, and corruption on tourism demand in the 
presence of historical and natural heritage. Garrod 
and Fyall (2000) asserted that a country’s heritage 
has a highly economic potential for generating tour-
ism revenue and sustaining the industry. Hence, our 
research question is whether those destinations that 
have world-renowned heritage are able to attract 
tourists even in the presence of political instabil-
ity. While examining the issue we employed panel 
data analysis because it combines cross-sectional 
and time-series data and can produce more reliable 
estimates (Baltagi, 2008).
The main contribution of this article is to dis-
tinguish the effects of political risks on tourism 
development especially in those vulnerable  UNESCO- 
listed heritage destinations. It aims to provide a 
projection of the costs of political instability, ter-
rorism, and corruption on tourism demand for these 
destinations. Furthermore, the key motivation of 
modeling tourism demand is to determine business 
Figure 1. Political instability, corruption, terrorism, and tourism growth (average between 1999 and 2009) 
for selected countries. Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and Euromonitor.
590 YAP AND SAHA
Furthermore, Pizam and Fleischer (2002) asserted 
that if a destination suffers from frequent terrorist 
attacks, its number of international tourist arrivals 
will constantly decline until its tourism industry 
eventually reaches a standstill.
However, political events such as a coup and inter-
nal political problems have far more severe impacts 
on tourism activity than one-off terrorist attack inci-
dents (Fletcher & Morakabati, 2008). Similarly, 
Neumayer (2004) found that a substantial increase 
in terrorist events lowers tourist arrivals by 8.8%; 
however, a substantial increase in human rights vio-
lation reduces tourist arrivals by 32%. In conclusion, 
the literature suggests that political conflict events 
have more severe impacts on tourism than terrorist 
attack incidents.
In relation to public sector corruption, it can be a 
barrier to tourism development. Duffy (2000) argued 
that the corrupt governments have the wealth, status, 
or power to intervene in tourism projects and allo-
cate resources that could render benefits to them per-
sonally. He further justified that these governments 
may allow illegitimate foreign investment in tourism 
developments; that is, hotels and tourism shops may 
be used for drug trade and money laundering.
Tourism policy makers of a country play an impor-
tant role in developing regulations to ensure tourists’ 
security and stability through control over resource 
mobility, intervention in development of local and 
regional areas, and provision of a legal framework for 
production, environmental, and consumer protection 
(Williams, 2004). Nevertheless, in a corrupt country, 
the authorities often breach the country’s tourism 
development policies with detrimental impact. For 
example, the Kenyan government failed to deal with 
environmental issues effectively and cooperate with 
local communities due to political corruption and 
constant changes in leadership, ensuing in a serious 
decline in ecotourism in the country (African Cen-
tre for Technology Studies [ACTS], 1998; Ikiara & 
Okech, 2002).
Nevertheless, the existing literature of corrup-
tion and tourism demand reveals some mixed con-
clusions. On one hand, even though Lau and Hazari 
(2011) agreed that corruption can have negative 
impacts on tourism, they found that their estimation 
results are inconsistent with the theory. The corrup-
tion coefficients were estimated to be between 0.093 
and 0.112, suggesting that an increase in corruption 
pp. 304–306). Political instability can be related to 
terrorism, riots, and wars (Sönmez, 1998), and its 
effects can deter a country’s tourism growth. Politi-
cally unstable countries constantly encounter chal-
lenges such as withdrawal of foreign investments 
and negative public image when the governments 
try to implement tourism planning strategies (Issa & 
Altinay, 2006).
The existing literature of political crises has 
shown evidence that political instability can hin-
der tourism development and damage economic 
growth. When a regime is being challenged for 
its political legitimacy from outside the political 
system, the intensity of the challenge would rise 
and provoke public violence and turmoil if the 
government fails to implement mutual resolutions 
 (Neumayer, 2004). Hall and O’Sullivan (1996) 
argued that prolonged political unrests can nega-
tively influence tourists’ perceptions on the affected 
destinations and that would discourage potential 
tourists to visit the countries as well as its neighbor-
ing regions (p. 105). Moreover, they asserted that if 
a country experiences a military coup or warfare, 
military activities can destroy tourist infrastructure 
and limit tourists’ comfort and convenience in trav-
eling (Hall & O’Sullivan, 1996, p. 108). With the 
decline in tourist numbers in a politically problem-
atic country, investments on the tourism industry 
will be affected and there is a tendency for the gov-
ernment to divert tourism investment resources to 
fund military activities.
Terrorism can be categorized in two ways. First, 
political instability can lead to terrorism when a civil 
society is denied the freedom of expressing politi-
cal discontent, leading the society to exert political 
pressure against the government and make terror-
ism more likely (Munson, 2008). Second, a country 
that experiences terrorist attacks may not necessar-
ily relate to home politics. Franks (2009) argued that 
some cases of terrorism threats can originate from 
al-Qaeda-type organizations that have no direct rela-
tion with those affected countries. Tourists’ safety is 
always vulnerable to terrorist-related incidents and 
internal conflicts in host countries. In the tourism lit-
erature, most empirical research reveals that tourism 
is susceptible to terrorism acts, particularly if terror-
ist attacks happen in developing countries (Baker & 
Coulter, 2007; Bhattarai, Conway, & Shrestha, 2005; 
Llorca-Vivero, 2008; Thompson, 2011; Yaya, 2009). 
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advantageous because such data provide more infor-
mation, more variability, less collinearity among the 
variables, more degrees of freedom, and more effi-
ciency (Baltagi, 2008).
To our best knowledge, there are two empirical 
papers that have conducted investigations on politi-
cal instability and corruption effects on tourism, 
respectively. The first is that of Neumayer (2004), 
who conducted an empirical investigation regard-
ing political instability impacts on tourism using 
fixed effects and a dynamic generalized method 
of moments panel data models.
1
 The second by 
Lau and Hazari (2011) explored the relationship 
between corruption and tourism using panel ordi-
nary least squares. Unlike the previous studies, 
the current article aims to develop an economet-
ric model that quantifies the effects of political 
risk, terrorist threat, and corruption on tourism by 
controlling various economic variables. The new 
model is designed in such a way that it can avoid 
any omitted variable bias and can be used to gener-
ate reliable forecasts.
The current research is distinct from the data and 
models proposed by Neumayer (2004). In our study, 
we first identify political risk variables [i.e., internal 
conflicts (IC), government stability (GS), religion in 
politics (RP), ethnic tensions (ET), external conflicts 
(EC), and military in politics (MP)] that have signifi-
cant influences on tourism demand data, which can 
then be used to create a composite index for political 
instability. Table 1 presents the description of politi-
cal risk variables that are used in this study. Second, 
we incorporate historical and natural heritage in the 
model. Third, we extend and update the number of 
countries and period of analysis from previous study. 
Finally, we estimate the moderation effect of politi-
cal instability and heritage to examine the role of 
UNESCO-listed heritage destinations in promoting 
the tourism industry.
We estimate the relationship between each politi-
cal risk variable and tourism demand by using the 
following model:
 ln TD
it
 = d
0
 + d
1
X
it
 + e
it
 (1)
where i = country; t = time; TD = tourism demand; 
ln = natural logarithm; X = the political risk indica-
tor which can be taken as IC, GS, RP, EC, ET, MP, 
CORR or TERROR; d
k
 = estimated coefficients for 
perception index will not have adverse effects on 
tourism development. On the other hand, Das and 
Dirienzo (2010) found that a reduction in corrup-
tion levels generate positive impacts on the level of 
tourism competitiveness across nations. In fact, a 
decline in corruption level for developing countries 
increases their competitiveness greater than that for 
developed countries.
According to Southall and Robinson (2011), heri-
tage tourism is defined as “visits to and experiences 
of places of historical importance and significance” 
(p. 177). It provides opportunities to visitors to 
reveal a country’s identity and a symbol of national 
pride. Organizations such as UNESCO play an 
important role in promoting destination images and 
sustaining national inheritance. It seeks to encour-
age the identification, protection, and preservation 
of cultural and natural heritage globally, which are 
considered to have significant value to humanity 
(UNESCO, 2013).
Nevertheless, many of these treasures are sus-
ceptible to damage or destruction due to wars, con-
stant terrorist attacks, and political riots. In fact, 
the restoration of these national heritages requires 
long-term planning and can be costly. Nuryanti 
(1996) claimed that developing countries face great 
challenges, particularly related to limited funding 
resources and management problems. Furthermore, 
Chheang (2008) argued that a developing country 
such as Cambodia had ruined its national treasures 
due to external intervention, French colonialism, 
and civil war. Unfortunately, despite the end of civil 
unrest in 1991, Chheang stressed that Cambodia’s 
tourism remains underdeveloped due to corruption. 
As incidents of political upheaval and public cor-
ruption are mostly evident in developing countries, 
it is no doubt that heritage sites can be at risk of 
ruin. Hence, tourism officials in those politically 
uncertain countries should not only implement 
policies to preserve and protect heritage, they also 
need to impose appropriate crisis management to 
avoid the disappearance of heritage tourism.
Data and Methodology
In this article, we examine the impact of political 
instability on tourism demand by employing a fixed-
effects panel data analysis for 139 countries over 
the period 1999–2009. The panel data models are 
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N = country dummy variable for world natural won-
ders approved by UNESCO; Y = real gross domes-
tic product (GDP) per capita; CEXC = changes in 
real exchange rates; IEXC = initial exchange rate; 
ATT = an indicator of tourist attractions. The model 
uses income and exchange rate indicators as the 
control variables. The income proxy variable is 
real GDP per capita, which measures the minimum 
income level that tourists could afford to travel to 
the country. It also represents a country’s living stan-
dards and economic performance as an indication 
of the government’s affordability to invest, build, 
and maintain infrastructures for tourism. Given the 
points above, we expect that the income coefficient 
sign should be positive. Changes in real exchange 
rates is the proxy variable for tourism price, which 
reflects the relative prices between origin and for-
eign countries (Lim, 2006). It is measured in national 
currency units per US dollar and adjusted by pur-
chasing power parity, and the original real exchange 
rates are transformed into first difference data to 
avoid nonstationary issues. The expected sign for 
CEXC is positive. Furthermore, we adopt the ini-
tial exchange rate variable to distinguish countries 
k = 0, 1,...,9, and e
it
 = error term. All political risk 
data are extracted from the International Coun-
try Risk Guide provided by the Political Risk Ser-
vices (PRS) group. The data are constructed on the 
basis of point scores, which indicate that high (low) 
scores mean high (low) risk.
2
 For tourism demand 
data, we employ the number of tourist arrivals and 
tourism revenue earned in each country i, which are 
extracted from Euromonitor International. Based on 
the Equation 1, the expected sign of d
1
 is negative, 
implying that the higher number of political unrest 
incidents in a country can cause serious decline in 
tourism demand.
Next, we extend Equation 1 by including country-
specific and economics variables, as shown in the 
following equation:
lnTD
it
 = d0 + d1Xit + d2H + d3N + 
d
4 
ln
 
Y
it
 + d
5 
ln CEXC
it
 + 
d
6
IEXC
it
 + d
7 
ln
 
ATT
it
 + e
it
 
(2)
where X = variables for political instability, corrup-
tion or terrorism; H = country dummy variable for 
world historical heritage approved by UNESCO; 
Table 1
Description of Political Risk Variables
Notation Variable name Description
GS Government stability The variable presents the government’s capability of carrying out its declared programs 
and its ability to stay in office. Its subcomponents include government unity, legisla-
tive strength, and popular support.
IC Internal conflict It assesses political violence in a country and its actual or potential impact on governance. 
The variable consists of two subcomponents: civil war/coup threat and civil disorder.
EC External conflict It measures the risk to the incumbent government from foreign action (i.e., diplomatic 
pressures, territorial disputes) and violent external pressure such as cross-border con-
flicts and war. Three subcomponents are included in the variable: war, cross-border 
conflict, and foreign pressures.
CORR Corruption This variable assesses corruption within the government, including excessive patronage, 
nepotism, job reservation, favor for favors, secret party funding, and suspiciously 
close ties between politics and business.
MP Military in politics It predicts the degree of military involvement in a government or the possibility of 
military takeover an elected government.
RP Religion in politics The variable measures the extent of single religious group dominating governance and 
the suppression of religious freedom.
ET Ethnic tensions The component assesses the degree of tensions due to racial, nationality, or language 
divisions. In particular, it provides an index regarding the degree of tolerant level and 
willingness to compromise by opposition group.
TERROR Terrorism This variable is separated from internal conflict so that we can examine how terrorism  
can negatively impact on tourism demand. It is an index that presents the perceptions  
of terrorist incidents in a country and whether terrorism is related to the country’s  
political violence.
Note: The description of the data is summarized and extracted from the PRS Group websites. For more detailed information, 
see http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx.
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corruption on tourism demand. The first part of 
the analysis focuses on the relationship between 
political instability (both individual and composite 
index), terrorism, and corruption with tourist arrival 
and tourism revenue only. The second part analyzes 
the effects after controlling several economic fac-
tors and with and without heritage variables by uti-
lizing panel fixed effects.
How much do political instability, terrorism, 
and corruption matter for the tourism industry? To 
quantify this, we begin the analysis by estimating 
the impact of individual and composite indices of 
political instability and corruption index without 
controls on tourist arrival (TA) and tourism revenue 
(TR). The results are reported in Table 2, suggesting 
that except for government stability (GS), all other 
individual as well as composite indices of politi-
cal instability have negative and significant effects 
on TA and TR. For example, a one-unit increase in 
composite political instability index reduces TA and 
TR by 50% and 56%, respectively. In other words, 
a higher political instability reduces tourist arrival 
and tourism revenue significantly and the magni-
tudes are considerable. In terms of individual com-
ponents of political instability, internal conflict (IC), 
external conflict (EC), military in politics (MP), 
and ethnic tension (ET) play crucial roles in reduc-
ing tourist arrival and tourism revenue. Terrorism 
(TERROR) and corruption (CORR) also illustrate 
similar effects. A one-unit increase in TERROR 
and CORR reduces tourist arrivals by 16% and 
35%, respectively. Interestingly, terrorism has less 
impact than political instability and corruption as 
the responses of composite political instability and 
corruption are elastic. The rest of the analysis mea-
sures the impact on tourism development by using 
composite political instability index.
The next step estimates the impact of political 
instability, terrorism, and corruption on tourism 
development using panel period fixed-effect esti-
mations after incorporating the standard economic 
controls in the tourism literature for 139 countries 
for the period 1999–2009. The results are reported 
in Table 3. The coefficient for political instability 
is negative and significant at the 1% level, indicat-
ing that higher political instability reduces tourist 
arrivals (TA) in a country. A one-unit increase in 
political instability decreases tourist arrivals by 
24% when there is no heritage dummy variable; 
that have high and low domestic currency values. 
The rational of using IEXC is to examine whether a 
country’s strong currency could have adverse effects 
on its tourism competitiveness. We anticipate that if 
a country has a strong currency at the beginning, 
there is a tendency that the travel cost to the coun-
try is expensive and potential tourists would choose 
other destinations that can offer them cheaper deals 
and better value for money. Hence, the expected sign 
for IEXC coefficient will be negative. All income 
and exchange rate data are extracted from the Penn 
World Table. Our research includes country-specific 
variables such as tourist attractions, which measure 
a country’s tourism revenues to visitors’ sites, and 
permanent attractions such as art galleries, muse-
ums, casinos, and national parks. The data are pro-
vided by Euromonitor. The descriptive statistics for 
all variables can be found in the Appendix.
Finally, we examine the relationship between 
political instability and tourism demand in 
 UNESCO’s heritage countries using the interaction 
term of X
it
 and heritage dummy (H or N). For exam-
ple, using the historical heritage dummy variable 
(H), Equation 3 is structured as follows:
ln
 
TD
it
 = d0 + d1Xit + d2H + d3Xit × H + 
d
4 
ln
 
Y
it
 + d
5 
ln CEXC
it
 + 
d
6
IEXC
it
 + d
7 
ln
 
ATT
it
 + e
it
 
(3)
Differentiating Equation 3 with respect to X
it
 
shows the marginal impact of political instability 
as:
 
,
1 3
,
ln i t
i t
TD
H
X
¶
= d + d
¶
 
(4)
A similar process applies to the N variable. The 
interaction coefficient (d
3
)between X
it
 and lnTD
it
 
shows the relationship between political instability 
and tourism demand for countries that possess his-
torical or natural heritage. The coefficient suggests 
that X
it
 decreases TD in historical heritage countries 
even though the impact is less compared to that of 
the nonheritage countries. We expect d
3 
> 0 and 
(d
1
 + d
3
) < 0.
Empirical Results
This section analyzes the empirical results of 
the impact of political instability, terrorism, and 
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corruption level would not have adverse influence 
on tourist arrival numbers, particularly for those 
countries that have historical and natural heritage. 
Perhaps, many experienced travelers have expecta-
tions that they would require paying bribes to cor-
rupt authorities for travel visa or permits to some 
tourist destinations in order to make things acces-
sible. For example, some tourist places or activities 
are restricted by the authorities in terms of available 
hours and numbers of tourists per day, which can be 
surmounted by paying bribes to the corrupt officials. 
Moreover, some tourist destinations require govern-
ment approvals to enter into the spot, and bribing 
government officials can make things accessible. 
However, the corruption coefficient becomes nega-
tive and significant when TR is used as the depen-
dent variable. Overall, the impact of corruption 
shows some interesting results on tourism demand. 
A higher level of corruption in a country might 
not indicate that the country’s tourist numbers will 
but it reduces further in the presence of historical 
and natural heritage (31%). Likewise, the political 
instability coefficient retains the negative sign and 
the significance level when tourism revenue (TR) 
is used as the dependent variable. We found simi-
lar results when tourism revenue as a percentage of 
GDP is used; however, the results are not reported 
here due to space limitation. This result supports 
the £2.5 billion decline in tourism revenue in Egypt 
together with a 32% decrease in tourist arrivals to 
the region since the revolution erupted on January 
25, 2011 (Shenker, 2012).
Likewise, the coefficient for CORR is negative 
and significant for the tourist arrivals as the depen-
dent variable, suggesting that a high level of corrup-
tion reduces tourist arrivals significantly. The result 
is consistent with Lau and Hazari (2011) and Das 
and Dirienzo (2010). However, the effect becomes 
positive when heritage variables are included in the 
estimation. This result illustrates that an increase in 
Table 2
Estimates and Elasticities of Political Instability Variables on Tourism Demand
Variables
Estimates Elasticity
ln(TA) ln(TR) TA TR
Composite of political instability (PI) -0.695*** -0.826*** -2.313 -2.749
(-0.058) (-0.062)
Terrorism (TERROR) -0.178*** -0.162*** -0.598 -0.544
(-0.031) (-0.036)
Government stability (GS) -0.034 -0.034 -0.117 -0.117
(-0.032) (-0.05)
Internal conflicts (IC) -0.734*** -0.834*** -2.003 -2.276
(-0.037) (-0.05)
External conflicts (EC) -0.425*** -0.614*** -1.064 -1.537
(-0.024) (-0.061)
Military in politics (MP) -0.403*** -0.496*** -1.666 -2.05
(-0.003) (-0.011)
Religion in politics (RP) -0.194*** -0.187*** -0.606 -0.584
(-0.01) (-0.012)
Ethnics tension (ET) -0.304*** -0.379*** -1.222 -1.523
(-0.008) (-0.012)
Corruption (CORR) -0.43*** -0.558*** -2.634 -3.419
(-0.008) (-0.011)
Note: TA, tourist arrival numbers; TR, tourism receipts. ln denotes natural logarithm. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
*** denotes significance at the 1% critical level. The elasticity value is derived as follows: For example, 0 where a and b are esti-
mates. The first-order differentiation yields 
TA
TA
PI
d
b
d
= . Using the differentiation equation and including PI and TA variables, 
the elasticity equation is 
PI TA
PI
TA PI
d
E b
d
= × = . The mean of PI is used to calculate the elasticity value.
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terrorist attack may attract international as well 
as domestic tourists to witness the destruction or 
rebuild activity after terrorist attacks. The  September 
11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New 
York City provides a good example of this posi-
tive effect. Now, when tourists visit New York City, 
they are also tempted to visit the reconstruction of 
Twin Towers.
The coefficients of H and N are positive and 
highly significant in all estimations, indicating that 
historical and natural heritage promote the tourism 
industry. Moreover, the control variables are signif-
icant and expected in signs with a few exceptions. 
A high level of per capita income and tourist attrac-
tions encourage the tourism demand of a country, 
whereas depreciation of currency promotes tour-
ism. A low level of initial exchange rate attracts 
more tourists to a country due to cheaper currency.
Overall, political instability reduces tourism 
demand substantially. The magnitude of the effect 
on tourism revenue is stronger compared to the 
tourist arrivals (Table 5). The stronger effect may be 
due to tourism revenue consisting of both interna-
tional and domestic tourists, whereas tourist arriv-
als contain only the international tourists. Control 
variables are all significant and expected in sign. 
Political instability, terrorism, and corruption with 
heritage dummy variables and control variables 
can explain around 62% to 72% of the variation 
in tourism demand (see Table 3). The implication 
of the results suggests that where political instabil-
ity or terrorist attacks occur, it is a simple choice 
for the tourists to switch their travel destination to 
where there is a lower or no risk at all. The results 
fall; nevertheless, there is a possibility that it can 
decrease tourism revenue. This result is consistent 
with countries like China, India, Indonesia, Thai-
land, and Turkey. Corruption index in these coun-
tries reflects a high level of corruption; however, 
the numbers of tourist arrivals to these countries are 
growing over time (see Table 4).
The coefficient for TERROR is negative and sig-
nificant only when TA is the dependent variable. 
A one-unit increase in terrorists’ activity decreases 
tourist arrivals by 4–7%. On the other hand, the 
impact of terrorist attacks on tourism revenue is 
positive, although not significant, suggesting that 
Table 4
Average Corruption Index and Growth in Tourism 
Demand From 1999 to 2009 for Selected Countries
Selected 
Countries
Average 
Corruption Index
Average 
Percentage Growth 
in Tourist Arrivals
Turkey 6.3 14.7
Indonesia 7.0 3.3
Thailand 7.5 5.1
Czech Republic 5.8 3.9
Uganda 7.0 17.6
China 7.3 6.0
India 6.6 7.9
Switzerland 3.1 1.2
UK 3.4 1.9
Singapore 3.4 4.4
US 3.7 1.5
Note: For corruption index, a country that has the lowest 
(highest) level of corruption would have a low (high) score. 
The index ranges between 1 and 10. Sources: PRS Group 
and Euromonitor.
Table 5
Impact of Political Instability, Terrorism, and Corruption on Tourism Demand
Percentage Change in Tourist Arrivals Percentage Change in Tourism Revenue
No heritage Heritage No heritage Heritage
PI -24% -31% -30% -36%
CORR -3% +4% -13% -6%
TERROR -4% -7% +1% -1%
Note: The figures shown are based on anti-natural logarithm of the coefficients from Table 3 minus one. For instance, in Table 3, 
the regression for tourist arrival model without heritage dummy variables is ln(TA) = 4.212 – 0.214PI + 0.314GDPPC – 0.059 
IEXC + 0.238CEXC + 0.292ATT. To measure the exp(0.214) – 1 = 0.24 percentage change in TA when PI changes by one unit, 
it can be calculated as: exp(0.214) – 1 = 0.24 or 24%.
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magnitudes of their effects are considerable. The 
negative effect varies from 1% to 36% on the tour-
ism revenue, for example. Corruption shows some 
interesting effects, indicating that corruption might 
not reduce tourism demand in a country if it is clas-
sified as UNESCO’s historical and natural heritage. 
Historical and natural heritage play crucial roles in 
attracting tourists to a country. However, even in 
the presence of heritage, political instability causes 
severe damage to the industry and the effects are 
stronger in comparison to terrorist attacks. Both 
causality (mediator) and interaction (moderator) 
effects show that heritage plays a vital role in pro-
moting tourism industry even though there are vari-
ous risks present in a country.
The policy implications of the study are twofold. 
First, for those countries that constantly face politi-
cal uncertainty, tourism officials must put more 
emphasis on tourism crisis management to maintain 
confidence in tourists’ security and to protect the 
countries’ iconic treasures. Sönmez, Apotolopoulos, 
and Tarlow (1999) asserted that even though 
 unpredictable terrorism acts and social unrest could 
happen anytime, destinations still need to be pre-
pared with an action plan for recovery marketing 
strategies and fund-raising activities to conserve 
perishable tourism products. Second, the study 
estimated the losses of tourism revenue if countries 
experience political upheavals and terrorism. The 
estimations are robust after using several indicators, 
specifications, and estimation techniques. In the con-
text of tourism demand modeling, it is important to 
include political instability, terrorism, and corrup-
tion variables as well as destinations’ heritage indi-
cators, so that forecasts about tourist arrivals and 
tourism revenues can be more accurate, which are 
vital to implementing effective plans for hotel and 
tourism development.
also indicate that the deterring effect of political 
instability on tourism demand is far greater than 
the impact of terrorism and corruption. In addition, 
Table 3 reflects that historical and natural heritage 
attract more tourists and generate high tourism rev-
enue in a country, but if there is political instability, 
then deterring effects are far greater compared to 
the countries that do not have any heritage.
Finally, after incorporating the interaction term, 
the sign of political risk variables remains the 
same; that is, high political risk causes damage to 
the tourism industry. The interaction term shows a 
positive sign with a few exceptions. The findings 
indicate that heritage plays an important role in 
attracting tourists. The marginal impact of PI on 
ln(TA) in historical heritage countries, for example, 
is -0.263 + (-0.063 ´  1) = -1.086 (refer to Table 6). 
That is, a one-unit rise in PI leads to a fall in ln(TA) 
coefficient by approximately 1.1. Outside heritage, 
a one-unit rise in PI leads to a fall in ln(TA) coef-
ficient by approximately 0.1. The marginal impacts 
are greater for historical heritage countries, which 
is consistent with our mediator effect results. How-
ever, for TERROR and CORR the marginal impacts 
are a little smaller in heritage destinations.
Conclusion
This article examines the performance of the 
tourism industry in terms of tourist arrivals and 
tourism revenue in the presence of political insta-
bility, corruption, and terrorism for 139 countries 
for the period 1999–2009 using panel fixed-effects 
estimation techniques. The results show that politi-
cal instability seems to have an adverse effect on 
tourism industry. In other words, ceteris paribus, 
political instability, corruption, and terrorism 
have negative effects on tourism demand and the 
Table 6
Marginal Impacts (MIs) of Political Instability on Tourism for UNESCO’s Heritage Countries
ln(TA) when H = 1 ln(TA) when N = 1 ln(TR) when H = 1 ln(TR) when N = 1
d1 d3 MI d1 d3 MI d1 d3 MI d1 d3 MI
PI -0.263 -0.063 -1.086 -0.122 -0.172 -0.294 -0.364 +0.105 -0.259 -0.259 +0.080 -0.193
CORR -0.017 +0.073 +0.056 -0.033 +0.062 +0.029 -0.130 +0.126 -0.004 -0.175 +0.148 -0.027
TERROR -0.072 +0.007 -0.065 -0.075 +0.097 +0.022 -0.021 +0.018 -0.003 -0.082 +0.211 +0.129
Note: Due to space limitation, we do not report the coefficients for other variables. However, we can provide them upon request.
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negative images, but it could also provide impor-
tant information about the actual effects of politi-
cal risk and corruption on future tourists. However, 
such research requires qualitative research methods 
that are beyond the scope of this study.
Notes
1
Neumayer (2004) employed internal and external con-
flicts variables as the proxies for political instability, and real 
effective exchange rate as the economics variable.
2
Note that the original scores provided by the PRS group 
interpret their political risk data as high (low) scores mean low 
(high) risks. For the ease of explanation, we rescale the PRS’s 
score points, where high (low) scores mean high (low) risks.
This study does not come without a limitation. 
The current research focused on past tourism data 
and not on potential tourists who intend to travel. As 
suggested by Hem, Iversen, and Nysveen (2002), 
destination images (i.e., advertisement photos) that 
portray a risky vacation situation could generally 
create negative effects on tourists’ intention to visit 
a destination. Hence, for future research, it would 
be interesting to investigate how a destination’s 
images of political risk, terrorist attacks, and cor-
ruption could influence potential tourists’ inten-
tion to visit. It would not only explain the behavior 
and attitude of tourists’ reactions to a destination’s 
Appendix
Descriptive Statistics of Tourism Demand and Political Instability Variables, 1999–2009
LTA LTR PI GS IC EC ET MP RP Terror Corr EXC LGDPPC LATT
Mean 7.16 6.68 3.33 3.46 2.73 2.50 4.02 4.13 3.13 3.36 6.13 375.26 8.76 3.45
Median 7.17 6.83 3.08 3.34 2.69 2.25 4 4 2.50 3.25 6.38 5.16 8.93 3.82
Max 11.30 11.86 7.15 7.63 7.33 8.41 10 10 10 10 10 40290 11.84 11.42
Min 1.74 -13.82 1.28 1.38 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.20 5.09 -13.82
SD 1.92 2.35 1.12 1.15 1.18 1.11 1.92 2.57 1.94 1.94 1.77 2178.87 1.38 3.69
Skewness -0.25 -1.94 0.86 0.36 0.99 1.42 0.38 0.53 1.03 0.69 -0.83 14.61 -0.38 -2.39
Kurtosis 2.63 16.93 3.43 2.59 4.13 5.94 2.36 2.30 3.47 2.99 3.26 251.95 2.32 12.54
Jarque-
Bera 23.85 13316.13 159 35.4 266 846 49.8 81.6 228 96.6 144.4 3185980 65.86 7254.06
Prob (JB) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00
Panel unit root test (null hypothesis: panel series is nonstationary)
LLC t 
statistics
a
-7.335 -9.126 -67 -23 -380 -447 -66 -48 -41 -1437 -641.7 -8.33 -4.79 -8.59
Prob 
(LLC) 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: LTA, natural logarithm of tourist arrivals; LTR, natural logarithm of tourism receipts; PI, composite of political instability; 
GS, government instability; IC, internal conflicts; EC, external conflicts; ET, ethics tension; MP, military in politics; RP, religion 
in politics; TERR, terrorism; CORR, corruption; EXC, real exchange rate (adjusted by PPP); LGDPPC, natural logarithm of 
gross domestic product per capita (adjusted by PPP); LATT, natural logarithm of tourist attraction.
a
LLC t statistics are based on the panel unit root tests.
References
African Centre for Technology Studies. (1998). What ails 
Kenya’s policy on wildlife? Retrieved from http://www.
aweer.org/in-depth/ind-what-ails-ke-pol.htm
Baker, K., & Coulter, A. (2007). Terrorism and tourism: The 
vulnerability of beach vendors’ livelihoods in Bali. Jour­
nal of Sustainable Tourism, 15(3), 249–266.
Baltagi, B. H. (2008). Econometric analysis of panel data. 
West Sussex, England: Wiley.
Bhattarai, K., Conway, D., & Shrestha, N. (2005). Tour-
ism, terrorism and turmoil in Nepal. Annals of Tourism 
Research, 32(3), 669–688.
Chheang, V. (2008). The political economy of tourism in 
Cambodia. Asia Pacific Journal of Tourism Research, 
13(3), 281–297.
Darity, E. W. A. (2008). Indices of political instability (2nd 
ed.). Detroit, MI: Macmillan Reference.
Das, J., & Dirienzo, C. (2010). Tourism competitiveness and 
corruption: A cross-country analysis. Tourism Econom­
ics, 16(3), 477–492.
Duffy, R. (2000). Shadow players: Ecotourism develop-
ment, corruption and state politics in Belize. Third World 
Quarterly, 21(3), 549–565.
Euromonitor. (2011). Impact of Middle East turmoil on 
travel and tourism. Sydney, Australia: Author.
Fletcher, J., & Morakabati, Y. (2008). Tourism activity, 
terrorism and political instability within the common-
wealth: The cases of Fiji and Kenya. International Jour­
nal of Tourism Research, 10(6), 537–556.
Franks, J. (2009). Rethinking the roots of terrorism: Beyond 
orthodox terrorism theory—A critical research agenda. 
Global Society, 23(2), 153–176.
Garrod, B., & Fyall, A. (2000). Managing heritage tourism. 
Annals of Tourism Research, 27(3), 682–708.
 DETERRING EFFECTS ON TOURISM DEVELOPMENT 599
Hall, C. M., & O’Sullivan, V. (1996). Tourism, politi-
cal stability and violence. In A. Pizam & Y. Mansfeld 
(Eds.), Tourism, crime and international security issues 
(pp. 105–212). West Sussex, UK: Wiley.
Hem, L. E., Iversen, N. M., & Nysveen, H. (2003). Effects of 
ad photos portraying risky vacation situations on inten-
tion to visit a tourist destination, Journal of Travel & 
Tourism Marketing, 13(4), 1–26.
Hoti, S., McAleer, M., & Shareef, R. (2005). Modelling 
country risk and uncertainty in small island tourism 
economies. Tourism Economics, 11(2), 159–183.
Hoti, S., McAleer, M., & Shareef, R. (2007). Modelling inter-
national tourism and country risk spillovers for Cyprus 
and Malta. Tourism Management, 28(6), 1472–1484.
Ikiara, M., & Okech, C. (2002). Impact of tourism on 
environment in Kenya: Status and policy. (Discussion 
Paper No. 19). Kenya: Kenya Institute for Public Policy 
Research and Analysis (KIPPRA).
Issa, I. A., & Altinay, L. (2006). Impacts of political instabil-
ity on tourism planning and development: The case of 
Lebanon. Tourism Economics, 12(3), 361–381.
Lagi, M., Bertrand, K. Z., & Bar-Yam, Y. (2011). The 
food crises and political instability in North Africa 
and the Middle East. Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1910031
Lau, T. S. C., & Hazari, B. R. (2011). Corruption and tour-
ism. In B. R. Hazari & R. Hoshmand (Eds.), Trade and 
welfare: Theoretical and empirical issues (pp. 159–170). 
New York: Nova.
Lim, C. (2006). A Survey of tourism demand modeling 
practice: Issues and implications. In L. Dwyer & P. 
 Forsyth (Eds.), International handbook on the econom­
ics of tourism (pp. 45–72), Northampton, England: 
Edward Elgar.
Llorca-Vivero, R. (2008). Terrorism and international tour-
ism: New evidence, Defence and Peace Economics, 
19(2), 169–188.
Mowforth, M., & Munt, I. (2009). Tourism and sustaina­
bility: Development, globalisation and new tourism in 
the Third World (3rd ed.). New York: Routledge.
Munson, Z. (2008). Terrorism. Contexts, 7(4), 78–79.
Narayan, P. K. (2005). Did Rabuka’s military coups have a per-
manent effect or a transitory effect on tourist expenditure 
in Fiji: Evidence from Vogelsang’s structural break test. 
Tourism Management, 26(4), 509–515.
Neumayer, E. (2004). The impact of political violence on 
tourism: Dynamic cross-national estimation. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 48(2), 259–281.
Nuryanti, W. (1996). Heritage and postmodern tourism. 
Annals of Tourism Research, 23(2), 249–260.
Pizam, A., & Fleischer, A. (2002). Severity versus frequency 
of acts of terrorism: Which has a larger impact on tourism 
demand? Journal of Travel Research, 40(3), 337–339.
Shenker, J. (2012, January 19). Egyption frustration as tour-
ists stay away. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/19/egypt-tourism-
visitor-numbers-collapse
Song, H., & Witt, S. F. (2006). Forecasting international tourist 
flows to Macau. Tourism Management, 27(2), 214–224.
Sönmez, S. F. (1998). Tourism, terrorism and political insta-
bility. Annals of Tourism Research, 25(2), 416–456.
Sönmez, S. F., Apostolopoulos, Y., & Tarlow, P. (1999). 
Tourism in crisis: Managing the effects of terrorism. 
Journal of Travel Research, 38(13), 13–18.
Southall, C., & Robinson, P. (2011). Heritage tourism. 
In P. Robinson, S. Heitmann, & P. U. C. Dieke (Eds.), 
Research themes for tourism (pp. 176–187), London: 
CAB International.
Thompson, A. (2011). Terrorism and tourism in developed 
versus developing countries. Tourism Economics, 17(3), 
693–700.
Tosun, C., & Timothy, D. (2001). Shortcomings in planning 
approaches to tourism development in developing coun-
tries: The case of Turkey. International Journal of Con­
temporary Hospitality Management, 13(7), 352–359.
United Nations World Tourism Organization. (2006). Pov­
erty alleviation through tourism: A compilation of good 
practices. Madrid, Spain: Author.
UNESCO (2013). World heritage list. Retrieved January 23, 
2013, from http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/
Williams, A. M. (2004). Toward a political economy of tour-
ism. In A. A. Lew, C. M. Hall, & A. M. Williams (Eds.), 
A companion to tourism (pp. 61–73). Malden, MA: 
Blackwell.
Yaya, M. E. (2009). Terrorism and tourism: The case of 
 Turkey. Defence and Peace Economics, 20(6), 477–497.
